USMCWeapons.com
My Experience
The M203 was designed as the replacement for the M79 grenade launcher used in the Vietnam era. You could say this is the poor mans' mortar because of its high trajectory of fire and low unit cost. The M203 also maintains the added versatility for direct fire from both the M16 and the M203 launcher tube.
The M203 is attached to the M16, just under the M16 barrel and forward of the slip rings. It looks similar to an over-under double barrel shotgun, with one barrel 40MM in size, and the other about 10 MM (at the M16 compensator). This dual system was combined to create a single effective weapon to be carried and used in many ways on the battlefield.
For instance, when obstacles are created to hamper the enemies movement, they also can provide that enemy cover against direct fire. With this weapon system, you can fire behind those obstacles, allowing the enemy to mass for destruction, but not for an attack. The M203 gives the individual fire team and squad the ability to cover their frontage similar to what the company can do with mortars. Streambeds and other depressions, as well as spurs and small outcroppings, are critical micro-terrain to both friendly and enemy troops. These become less useful to the enemy because of the Team Leader's ability to cover those positions with indirect fire from the M203, dropping rounds behind and into those places with deadly accuracy.
In addition to providing defensive coverage, the M203 can be used to provide illumination for night fires, signals for maneuvering and effective fires against massed or dug in positions. In the direct fire mode, the M203 can also be used as a shotgun. I have not seen these types of rounds issued for some years and tend to believe that there has been less emphasis on these types of rounds because the skill level required to fire them is minimal. However, at one time I had the opportunity to fire several shotgun rounds from the M203 at a distance of about 20 meters with good effect on the target. Anything further then that and the spread of the rounds was too large. I can not remember how may projectiles were in the buckshot round, but the effect on the target reminded me of a claymore in its spread and impact.
Practice, practice, practice. That is what is required to become proficient with the M203. The low velocity 40 MM round is more susceptible to wind and therefore requires more practice then say, the M16 in windy weather. Watching inexperienced Marines fire this weapon engrains the notion that this is not as simple as it looks, however, once a Marine catches on to sighting and aligning the weapon, the accuracy increases dramatically. The hardest part to firing this weapon is getting rounds to fire. I am not sure of the cost per round, but in my reserve unit there is always a limited supply, resulting in a lack of sufficient practice for the Marines who carry this weapon.
Not every Marine in the rifle company will carry this weapon. In the infantry units, only the Team Leaders in each squad carries this system. Each Marine is assigned a specific weapon. Initially the Marine carries the M16. The average Marine carries the M16 for a majority of his career. As they gain in seniority and experience (and a position is available to move into), the Marine would then move to a M249 SAW. Finally, upon reaching the position of Team Leader, they would be assigned an M203.
With seniority and experience comes the responsibility of mastering a new weapon system. I say mastering and not just learning, because the Marine must become a master of the weapon in order to function as a highly effective team member, reacting to all situations appropriately. Marines don't want to rely on other Marines who "almost" know something. That gets people killed, and not necessarily the right people either.
I have carried and fired this weapon for several years. The only negative experience I have had is when I was in Infantry Training School, just after boot camp where a Marine was killed and several other were injured, not for failing to master the weapon, but as the result of a malfunction of the weapon system.
The sea-Story
We were on the M203 range at Camp Pendleton, Ca in the summer of 1986. It was a normal day; hot, dry and full of stress and excitement. Reveille was at 0530, so around 0600 we headed over to the chow and returned to the barracks to gather our gear, forming back up at 0700 to march to the range. The march to the range was your typical Marine Corps walk-at-a-break-neck-speed-march, leaving the softhearted and broken Marines in the rear, eating dust and suffering the humiliation of the troop handlers as they yelled at the Marines for falling behind and who also provided occasional nudges of encouragement to catch up.
Once we arrived at the range we were provided more instruction on how to handle the weapon on the range, how to load and aim it, as well as a healthy demonstration, which provided us with even more motivation. We were all excited about firing the M203, boasting to each other about who would hit the targets and who would miss.
I had not yet fired my rounds on that day, nor would I have the chance. I was waiting in line, three Marines behind my bunk-mate, eagerly watching those in front of us fire so I could learn from their mistakes before I got on the firing line.
My bunk-mates turn finally came and he moved up in line to fire his first rounds from the M203. Sgt. Nunez, one of our troop handlers, was giving commands at our position. We liked Sgt. Nunez. He was hard, as were all of the instructors, but he was friendly too, talking to us like we were real Marines and not just the boots we were. My bunk-mate followed the direction given to him by Sgt. Nunez. He was given the command to kneel, and he did so. He was given the command to open the breach, and he did so. He was given a grenade by Sgt. Nunez and was instructed to place it in the breach for loading, and he did so. He was told to close the breach, and he did so. Upon closing the breach, the grenade exploded.
The noise and concussion of the grenade exploding was thunderous and immediate. Sgt. Nunez was mortally wounded in the head, falling to the ground, while my bunk-mate attempted to stand up. It was then he realized his arm was missing.
It took three Marines to hold down my bunk-mate so that the corpsman could put a tourniquet on his elbow, above his missing arm. There were other Marines with shrapnel in their arms and legs, where the body armor had not provided protection, but none were seriously injured and the corpsmen on the range were able to tend to them.
The troop handlers yelled at us to turn around and face the tree line, but many of us kept watching until the Life Flight arrived taking both Sgt. Nunez and my bunk-mate away. The march back to the barracks was much slower, with a heavy silence, except the occasional caught from the dust. When we returned to the barracks, we wrote statements on what we saw and heard and turned them in for review. The next day was almost back to normal, except the obvious absence of Sgt. Nunez and the occasional Marine pulled into the senior instructors' office for questioning or counseling. Finally, that afternoon, a formation was held and the announcement was made that Sgt. Nunez was pronounced dead upon arrival at the hospital.
Later that week I visited my bunk-mate in the hospital. He was upbeat, but, was definitely on his way out of the Corps. He told me he would be heading to college on the Marine Corps tab, once he was able to get out of the hospital. Our visit was short and I lost track of him after that. I am not sure how it worked out for him, but I hope he was able to move on successfully.
There was an investigation into the accident. Until that investigation was complete no HEDP (High Explosive, Dual Purpose) 40 MM grenades were fired in the Marine Corps. I was never made aware of the official explanation of why the grenade went off, however, with most of the weapon system destroyed, and the round expended, it must have been difficult to determine an exact cause.
Opportunities for Improvement
My complaints against the M203 are the way the sling attaches to this weapon and the way the quadrant sight attaches to the M16.
Because there is no change in the sling mount from a plain M16, to a M203, the sling can get in the way of the launcher tube, subsequently getting shot off or deflecting the round. Most Marines compensate for this by removing the sling from the M16 entirely, or rig the sling around the launcher tube or front sight of the M16. The best method in my opinion is taking the sling off entirely. This provides safety when firing and helps with noise discipline during movement. It would make more sense if the M203 itself had a side sling swivel with which a sling could be attached. This method may create a slight twist in the sling, but would prevent the sling from getting in front of the M203 launcher tube, while providing a method of carry.
The quadrant site is one of two sites used to fire this weapon. The leaf site, which is affixed on top of the M203, to the rear of the iron site of the M16 itself, is used for area targets. The quadrant site attaches to the M203 on the side of the M16 carrying handle. This site is used for precision firing at point targets. My issue is with the way the site is attached to the M16 carrying handle. The quadrant site is attached through the side of the carrying handle with a screw that is hand tightened. The problem with this is that the screw becomes loose, more often then not, and is either lost or simply taken off by the Marine. It makes no sense to take the site off the weapon, unless it is for storage purposes. However, if you have ever lost a piece of gear in the Marine Corps, you know that Marines will pack away valuable gear rather then take a chance on loosing it and feeling the wrath of the chain of command. For simplicity sake, the quadrant site works well. But its connection to the M203 appears to be an afterthought, rather then a design requirement.
Reader Comments to the Authors' complaints
I had stated that there should be a better way to attach the sling to the M203. A Marine Corps armory custodian read the article and sent me a copy of the TM. I am now enlightened. Thanks Sgt.Michaelson!
According to Training Manual (TM) 9-1010-221-10, from the Department of the Army, published in December of 1984, updated in 1992 there is indeed a proper method for attaching the sling to the M203. The picture in the TM clearly shows a slide sling swivel. Now what the TM does not show me, but points out nonetheless, is that once again the Marine Corps is either behind a few years, or just does not have the extra $1.32 to spend on this option. Why would we not have these on all of our M203s? Check out Sgt.Michaelson's comments for a bit more of an explanation from inside the Marine Corps.
M203 Nomenclature
It is a lightweight, compact, breech loading, pump action, single shot launcher attached to the M16A2 Rifle.
The characteristics of the M203 Grenade Launcher
Weight:
Launcher: 3 pounds (1.36 kilograms)
Rifle (M16A2): 8.79 pounds (3.99 kg)
Total (including 30 rounds): 11.79 pounds (5.35
kg)
Bore diameter: 40mm
Maximum effective range:
Area target: 1148.35 feet (350 meters)
Point target: 492.15 feet (150 meters)
Maximum range: 1312.4 feet (400 meters)
Minimum safe range:
Training: 426.53 feet (130 meters)
Combat: 101.71 feet (31 meters)
Unit Replacement Cost: $601
Works Cited
M79 Pictures, M203
Characteristics:
Originally created by John Pike, "M203 40mm Grenade Launcher"
FAS <http://www.fas.org> Tuesday, February 22, 2000
M203 Photos courtesy of Chief Skrdlant P.W.
Within Range
An E Company 2/24 Marine fires on his target with an M203
practice round on a Fort Riley, Kansas range.
A little light
Providing
illumination on the battlefield. an E Company 2/24 Marine follows through
after the shot for placement of his next white star parachute.
NBC Condition
Proficiency with a weapons system is the ability to fire it in any situation. Pictured above is an E Company 2/24 Marine firing in a static position with his gas mask